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Using data from the 2003 national Online Survey Certification and Reporting System, this
study examines how the structure of social service staffing in nursing homes is affected
by organizational and contextual factors. The results suggest that, although federal regulations impose minimal obligation, requiring only facilities with more than 120 beds to
employ qualified social service providers, nearly 12 percent of these facilities failed to
meet this staffing requirement in 2003. Results further suggest that the skill mix of social
service providers in nursing homes is influenced by market competition, market demand,
facility ownership, aggregate resident acuity, and the proportion of facility residents funded
by Medicare.

Over 1 million persons reside in more than 16,000 nursing home facilities across the United States, and it is important to examine how
psychosocial care is delivered by social service providers in those facilities
(National Center for Health Statistics 2006). This study explores how
the structure of social service staffing is influenced by variations in facility service environments as well as by market factors surrounding U.S.
Medicare- and Medicaid-certified nursing homes.
The Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 (101 Stat. 1330-160) requires
all facilities to provide medically related social service, but it does not
Social Service Review (December 2009).
䉷 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0037-7961/2009/8304-0006$10.00
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mandate licensure for qualified social service providers and it specifies
training standards only for facilities with more than 120 beds. Facilities
of that size are required to employ at least one qualified full-time social
service provider (42 C.F.R. 483.15 [2005]). Further, despite the complex
medical and psychosocial needs of nursing home residents, the required
credentials for a qualified provider in a facility with more than 120 beds
are (1) “a bachelor’s degree in social work or a bachelor’s degree in a
human services field, including but not limited to sociology, special
education, rehabilitation counseling, and psychology,” and (2) “1 year
of supervised social work experience in a health care setting working
directly with individuals” (42 C.F.R. 483.15[g] [3] [2005]).

Staffing and Nursing Home Quality
Professional standards exceed minimum federal standards for providers’
qualifications and the psychosocial care they provide. The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) identifies a professional social
worker as minimally qualified to provide nursing home care if the individual holds a bachelor of science degree in social work, a state license
(where applicable), and at least 2 years of postuniversity experience
(NASW 2003). Established clinical indicators of quality psychosocial services in nursing homes include providing individualized psychosocial
assessment, individualized care planning, and protection of resident
rights, as well as the promotion of resident choice, problem resolution,
and family involvement in care (NASW 1993).
Although concerns for the quality of resident care permeate federal
regulations, the regulations do not specifically link quality of care to
the tasks that social service providers perform. Standards for care are
expressed generally through standards for resident assessment, care
planning, discharge planning, and family involvement. An additional
regulatory category, administration, requires facilities to ensure that staff
members meet state standards for professional practice, including state
licensure where applicable (42 C.F.R. 483.75 [g] [2005]).
State efforts to meet minimum federal standards are marked by variation in social service provider qualifications, training, staffing ratios,
and care models (Allen, Nelson, and Netting 2007; Bern-Klug 2008;
University of Minnesota n.d.). Although nursing research recognizes
staffing as a component of nursing home care quality (Harrington et
al. 2000; Institute of Medicine 2001; Wan 2003; Wan, Zhang, and Unruh
2006), social service staffing is not considered an important indicator
of such quality (Vourlekis et al. 2005).
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Online Survey Certification and Reporting System (OSCAR)
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services certify nursing homes
that provide care paid for by Medicare and Medicaid. The centers mandate that every Medicare- or Medicaid-certified facility provide yearly survey information on facility characteristics (e.g., ownership and number
of beds), staffing (including social service providers), and results of state
government inspections. The Online Survey Certification and Reporting
System, or OSCAR, represents the only national system that contains such
data on social service providers. Reported staffing levels represent the
levels in the 2 weeks prior to the survey. In OSCAR, social service staffing
levels are originally calculated as full-time-equivalent employees, but the
system distinguishes full-time, part-time, and contract employees. A fulltime employee is defined in OSCAR as someone who works 35 hours
per week. A contract social service provider is defined in the system as
an individual or organization contracted to provide social services. Contract providers may be primarily off-site from the facility. In OSCAR,
qualified social service providers (i.e., those who meet the minimum
federal credential standard) are differentiated from providers who do
not meet the federal standard and who are not volunteers (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services 2002). Providers in this Other category
bear many titles, and states vary in the credentials they require these
Other workers to hold. Other category social service providers include
workers with such titles as aide, designee, and assistant. Some states
require these workers to have only a high school or general equivalency
diploma (University of Minnesota n.d.).
Capturing data on all U.S. nursing home facilities, the staffing measures in OSCAR are widely used to examine staffing and quality (Mullan
and Harrington 2001; Schnelle 2004). A recent effort to examine the
concurrent reliability of OSCAR staffing measures finds that OSCAR’s
social service staffing measures are highly correlated (.62) with a survey
research instrument designed specifically to measure staffing (Feng et
al. 2005). Nevertheless, previous research notes state-level variation in
survey administration and enforcement of sanctions for deficiencies
(Kash, Hawes, and Phillips 2007). Overreporting of nurse staffing levels
has also been noted (Harrington, Carrillo, and Mercado-Scott 2005).

Conceptual Framework and Study Model
Staffing is a structural component of the facility service environment
within the nursing home, and it is also integral in the process of delivering care. Much of the research on health services organizations relies
on this structure-process relationship to predict such outcomes as quality
of care (Donabedian 1966, 1988). As little is known about social service
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in nursing homes, the current study focuses on the structure of social
service staffing and not on outcomes. The structure of social service
staffing encompasses the number of social service providers available in
a facility and the mix of qualifications held by providers.
A limitation of the structure-process-outcome approach to examining
the performance of health service environments is that the approach
does not consider how outside forces influence facility performance.
For social service, these outside contextual factors include federal and
other regulations as well as such marketplace forces as the demographic
profile of the community. This study focuses on social service providers
as a structural resource that nursing home facilities use in response to
other structural, process, and contextual demands that are not related
to staffing.
Structural Factors within the Facility Service Environment
Beyond staffing, structural aspects of facility service environments also
include such characteristics as the owner of a facility, whether it is a
chain member, and the mix of residents (their overall number, sources
of funding for care, and level of acuity). Resident acuity represents the
intensity of residents’ service needs. It is based on the types of medical
interventions received and degree of disability in activities of daily living
(Cowles 2002). Previous research suggests that facility size, chain affiliation, ownership, payment mix, provider category, and the mix of cases
by resident acuity are each associated with nursing home staffing (Harrington et al. 2000; Wan 2003; Mor et al. 2004; Rantz et al. 2004).
Several studies tie large facilities to low levels of nurse staffing (Aaronson, Zinn, and Rosko 1994; Cohen and Spector 1996; Zinn, Weech,
and Brannon 1998). Among facilities exceeding the 120-bed threshold
(at which point federal regulations require qualified social service staffing), facility size may have different effects than those found in studies
of nurse staffing. Having an adequate number of social service staff
within a large facility may be especially important, as large facilities are
associated with poor quality-of-care outcomes (Castle and Fogel 1998;
Harrington et al. 2000). Further, most nursing homes are chain members, and chain membership is identified as an important influence on
social work in nursing homes (Kruzich 2004). Facility membership in
a chain is also associated with low professional qualifications for social
service directors (Simons 2006).
Structural variables included in the current study model are ownership,
payer mix, hospital affiliation, and resident acuity. Ownership of facilities
is often cited as a factor that influences staffing; for-profit ownership is
negatively associated with the number of professional staff, and nonprofit
ownership is positively related to overall staffing levels (Aaronson et al.
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1994; Harrington et al. 2005; Hillmer et al. 2005; Simons 2006). Payer
mix, the proportions of facility residents funded, respectively, by Medicare
and Medicaid, is affected by state-level variation in reimbursement rates
for Medicaid nursing home services. Some research links high proportions
of residents on Medicare with high staffing levels (Harrington et al. 2000).
The Medicare and Medicaid systems create a two-tiered system of nursing
home care. In nursing homes serving Medicaid residents, the numbers
of staff and the quality of care are often poor (Mor et al. 2004).
Resident acuity is an important covariate in studies related to staffing.
Facilities with more acute residents have greater staffing levels. Individuals with higher acuity care needs are more likely to enter facilities with
high staffing levels (Harrington et al. 2005). These facility-level variations in acuity interact with other structural factors and are found to
account for some of the variation in staffing levels (Mueller et al. 2006).
Contextual Factors Influencing the Facility Service Environment
Several contextual factors are known to affect the facility service environment of nursing homes. These include geographic location and market forces, as well as regulations that affect both the staff rendering care
and the organization of the facility (Wan et al. 2006; Zinn et al. 2007).
The current study includes two key contextual variables: market competition and market demand for nursing home beds.
Research Question and Hypotheses
This study asks the following question: If analyses adjust for market
factors and other aspects of the facility service environment, is variation
in the structure of social service staffing across nursing homes based on
their size and chain membership? The assessment begins by describing
the distribution of qualified and Other category social service staff across
facility service environments for nursing homes. The study tests two
hypotheses.
First, if analyses consider nursing homes with 121 or more beds, adjusting for facility size, ownership, payer mix, hospital affiliation, resident
acuity, market competition, and market demand, the size of the facility
and the absence of chain membership are hypothesized to be associated
with the likelihood that a facility will follow federal regulation in employing a qualified social service provider. Second, if models focus on
all facilities, adjusting for facility size, ownership, payer mix, hospital
affiliation, resident acuity, market competition, and market demand,
facility size and the absence of chain membership are hypothesized to
be positively related to the likelihood that a facility will employ Other
category social service providers.
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Data and Methods
Data Sources
This study uses a retrospective cross-sectional design. It relies on 2003
OSCAR data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and
on 2000 data from the Area Resource File (ARF) database maintained
by the Health Resources and Services Administration. Nearly all nursing
home facilities federally certified for Medicare and Medicaid are included in the OSCAR system. State inspectors collect OSCAR data every
9–15 months to verify nursing home compliance with all federal and
state regulatory requirements.
Data Cleaning
Data for this study were cleaned to eliminate extreme outliers. Data
cleaning criteria were based on techniques employed in other research
using the OSCAR data. Facilities in Puerto Rico, the U.S. territories,
and Washington, DC, are excluded from analysis because of a small
number of OSCAR surveys from these locations (Harrington et al.
2000; Intrator et al. 2005; Mueller et al. 2006). If facility identification
codes were duplicated, the most recent survey data are used; if the
dates of the surveys were identical, one is randomly selected (Castle
2000). The analyses exclude facilities reporting more residents than
beds, fewer than 15 residents, or greater than 100 percent occupation
(Harrington et al. 2000; Zhang and Grabowski 2004; Mueller et al.
2006). If the staff-to-resident ratio was greater than one, the facility is
also excluded (Degenholtz et al. 2006). The 2003 OSCAR data contain
surveys from 16,323 nursing homes. After data cleaning, 14,194 nursing homes (or 85 percent) remain in the study.
Geographic and demographic information on the nursing home market is obtained from ARF data, as is the information on market competition and demand. Data from OSCAR and ARF are merged to enable
a study of the effects of organizational and market factors on social
service staffing.
Dependent Variables: Staffing Structure
The dependent variables for the study are two social service staffing
items measured in the OSCAR database: (1) the number of qualified
social service providers employed in each sampled facility with 121 or
more beds and (2) the total number of Other category social service
providers in all sampled facilities. This study relies on OSCAR survey
documentation in defining Other social service providers as “persons
other than the qualified social worker who are involved in providing
medical social services to residents” (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
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Services 2002, 6). In the OSCAR data, both dependent variables are
measured as full-time-equivalent employees (FTE; in this case, providers) and reflect the availability of social service in nursing homes, regardless of whether the services are provided by full-time, part-time, or
contract employees. Both dependent variables are treated as binary variables. The number of qualified social service providers in a facility is
coded as 0 if its full-time qualified provider number is equal to or greater
than 1. It is coded as 0 if otherwise. The total number of Other category
social service providers is coded as 1 if its full-time Other provider number is greater than 0 and as 0 otherwise. Because 68.8 percent of nursing
homes in the study have fewer than 121 beds, and thus are not required
to employ a qualified social service provider, the binary measurement
of dependent variables is appropriate to examine the factors associated
with the supply of qualified providers in facilities of at least 121 beds.
Independent Variables
Facility size is measured by the total number of Medicare- and Medicaidcertified nursing home beds. Chain membership, indicating affiliation
with a group of nursing homes owned by the same organization, is
treated as a dichotomous variable in the OSCAR data. A facility is coded
as 1 if it is a member of a chain and as 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
Controlled organizational factors include nursing home ownership (categorized as for-profit, nonprofit, or government), payer mix (percentage
of residents on Medicare and percentage of those on Medicaid), hospital
affiliation (whether or not the home is a hospital-based facility), and a
facility-level resident acuity index. Controls for two contextual factors,
market competition and market demand, are derived from indicators
in the ARF database. Market competition is measured by the HerfindahlHirschman Index and is calculated as

冘(
n

H-H index p

ip1

2

)

Number of beds in a nursing home
Number of beds in a county

,

(1)

where n represents the total number of nursing homes, i represents
each nursing home and represents the summation of squared market
share of each nursing home. A higher value on the H-H score indicates
less competition. Market demand is measured by the percentage of
people 75 years or older in the county where a nursing home is located.
Resident acuity is a weighted case-mix index developed by the Cowles
Research Group (Cowles 2002). The index reflects resident need for
assistance with activities of daily living, such as transferring from a seated
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to a standing position and receipt of intensive medical therapies. Possible scores range from 0 to 38.1
Analysis
Descriptive analysis of the study variables is conducted for two samples:
(1) facilities with 121 or more beds and (2) all facilities. Two binomial
logistic regression models are used to test the two hypotheses in the
study because the dependent variables in the two hypotheses are both
binary categorical variables. Model 1 tests the first hypothesis using the
subsample of nursing homes with 121 or more beds; the second binomial
model tests the second hypothesis using the sample of all nursing homes.
The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests are used to evaluate
the performance of the models (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Odds
ratios and their statistical significances are used to assess the effects of
the hypothesized variables. An odds ratio greater than one indicates a
positive relation between the independent variable and the dependent
variable; an odds ratio smaller than one indicates a negative relation.
The statistical significance level is fixed at .05. The model results are
produced using SAS 9 software (version 9).
Beside main effects, the logistic regression models examine possible
interactions between independent and control variables. Resulting interaction effects, statistical significance, and main effects are reported
in the tables.

Results
Descriptive statistics of study variables are presented in table 1. The
table suggests that the facility size, measured as the average number of
beds in all sampled facilities, is 112. The sample includes 4,424 (31.1
percent) facilities that have 121 or more beds. Of those facilities, 88.18
percent employ at least one qualified social service provider; 44.83 percent of all sampled facilities reportedly employ Other category social
service providers. In table 1, the total qualified provider FTE represents
the number of full-time-equivalent employees (in this case, providers).
This item is based upon the OSCAR staffing calculation guidelines,
which identify 35 working hours per week as full-time employment.
Among facilities of any size, average total qualified provider FTE was
1.156, and average total Other social service provider FTE was .548. Of
the 14,424 facilities in the full sample, 53.10 percent are chain members
and 66.56 percent are owned by a for-profit entity. The reported percentages in facilities with 121 or more beds mirror those described
above. A small percentage (7.40 percent) of all facilities are affiliated
with hospitals. In facilities with 121 or more beds, this percentage is
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables for
U.S. Nursing Home Facilities in 2003

Variable
Dependent variables:
Employment of qualified SSP (%)
Employment of other SSP (%)
Qualified SSP:
Total QP FTE
Total full-time QP FTE
Total part-time QP FTE
Total contract QP FTE
Other SSP:
Total Other provider FTE
Total full-time Other provider FTE
Total part-time Other provider FTE
Total contract Other provider FTE
Covariates:
Chain membership (%)
Nonprofit ownership (%)
For-profit ownership (%)
Government ownership (%)
Hospital-affiliated facility (%)
Facility size (total no. of beds)
% of residents on Medicare
% of residents on Medicaid
% of age 75⫹ residents in county
Market competition
Resident acuity

121 or More
Beds
(n p 4,424)

120 or Fewer
Beds
(n p 9,770)

M or %

SD

M or %

SD

M or %

SD

88.18
48.40

NA
NA

52.75
43.21

NA
NA

63.79
44.83

NA
NA

All Facilities
(N p 14,194)

1.910
1.769
.122
.020

1.562
1.490
.367
.148

.815
.715
.076
.025

.710
.698
.274
.137

1.156
1.043
.090
.023

1.168
1.125
.307
.141

.750
.664
.077
.008

1.161
1.092
.286
.102

.456
.395
.056
.006

.701
.670
.213
.069

.548
.479
.062
.007

.882
.834
.238
.081

53.28
26.72
66.79
6.49
3.80
183.310
12.04
66.74
6.27
.144
10.327

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
84.105
11.90
19.20
1.79
.193
1.370

53.02
27.83
66.45
5.72
9.04
79.795
12.27
61.91
6.81
.231
10.117

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
28.326
16.65
23.83
2.30
.251
1.621

53.10
27.48
66.56
5.96
7.40
112.059
12.20
63.41
6.64
.204
10.182

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
71.103
15.33
22.60
2.17
.238
1.550

Note.—NA p not applicable; SSP p social service provider; QP p qualified provider; FTE p fulltime-equivalent employees. Unless otherwise specified, results are means.

even smaller (3.80 percent). On average, 63.41 percent of residents in
nursing homes are reported to be Medicaid beneficiaries.
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression of qualified social
service providers in facilities with 121 or more beds. The Hosmer and
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test shows that the model explains part of the
variance, since the p-value of the test is greater than .05. Results suggest
that the variable representing facility size is statistically significantly related to the odds of employing a qualified social service provider (OR
p 1.003). The results indicate that, for each additional bed supplied,
a nursing home has 0.3 percent greater odds of following the federal
standard by employing a qualified social service provider. Results for
the measure of chain membership are not statistically significantly related to the dependent variable. All in all, the findings partially support
the first hypothesis, which posits that facility size and chain membership
are associated with the likelihood of employing a qualified social service
provider.
Three other variables are associated to a statistically significant degree
with the odds of employing a qualified social service provider: nonprofit
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Table 2
Results of Binary Logistic Regression on the Employment
of Qualified Social Service Providers

Variable
Categorical variables:
Chain membership (vs. no chain membership)
Nonprofit ownership (vs. for-profit ownership)
Government ownership (vs. for-profit ownership)
Hospital-affiliated (vs. not)
Continuous variables:
Facility size (total no. of beds)
% of 75⫹ residents in countya
% of residents on Medicare
% of residents on Medicaid
Resident acuity
Market competition
Chi-square (df)b

OR

95% CI

1.188
1.537*
1.296
.615

.978,
1.200,
.843,
.372,

1.443
1.969
1.994
1.018

1.003*
1.028
.841
1.298
1.146*
.583*
8.544

1.002, 1.005
.975, 1.083
.324, 2.187
.709, 2.375
1.072, 1.226
.374, .910
(8)

Note.—The table presents results for a subsample of facilities with more than 120 beds
(n p 4,424). OR p odds ratio; CI p confidence interval.
a
Percentage of 75⫹ population # 100.
b
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test; p p .382.
* Statistically significant at the .05 level.

ownership, resident acuity, and market competition. Among them, market competition is found to have the strongest effect on the employment
of qualified social service providers (OR p .583). The odds ratio suggests that the likelihood of employing a qualified social service provider
diminishes as market competition increases. However, resident acuity
and nonprofit ownership are found to be positively related to the odds
of employing qualified social service providers.
Table 3 presents the results of logistic regressions examining the second hypothesis. This model tests the hypothesis that facility size and
chain membership are related to employment of social service providers
in the Other category. Results of the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodnessof-fit test show that the p-value of the test is greater than .05. Both chain
membership (OR p .909) and facility size (OR p 1.002) are found to
be statistically significantly related to the odds of employing at least one
worker in the Other category. The odds ratios indicate that chain-member nursing homes are less likely to employ the Other category social
service provider than are homes that are not members of chains. The
odds of employing an Other category provider are positively associated
with facility size. These findings support the second hypothesis, which
holds that facility size is positively related to the odds of employing an
Other category provider and that chain membership is negatively related
to these odds.
Six other variables in the model are also found to be statistically
significantly related to the odds of employing an Other category pro-
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Table 3
Results of Binary Logistic Regression of the Employment
of Other Social Service Providers
Variable
Categorical variables:
Chain membership (vs. no chain membership)
Nonprofit ownership (vs. for-profit ownership)
Government ownership (vs. for-profit ownership)
Hospital-affiliated (vs. not)
Continuous variables:
Facility size (total no. of beds)
% of 75⫹ residents in countya
% of residents on Medicare
% of residents on Medicaid
Resident acuity
Market competition
Interaction 1b
Chi-square (df)c

OR

.909*
.852*
.924
.728*
1.002*
.970*
.551*
1.120
.964*
.601*
1.001*
7.305

95% CI

.847,
.784,
.788,
.623,

.975
.927
1.083
.851

1.001, 1.002
.950, .992
.405, .750
.923, 1.360
.942, .985
.390, .927
1.001, 1.002
(8)

Note.—N p 14,194. OR p odds ratio; CI p confidence interval.
a
Percentage of 75⫹ population # 100.
b
Percentage of county residents age 75 or older # market competition.
c
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test; p p .504.
* Statistically significant at the .05 level.

vider. These include nonprofit ownership, hospital affiliation, the percentage of residents age 75 or over in a county, the percentage of residents on Medicare, resident acuity, and market competition. The odds
ratios attached to these six variables are less than one. This suggests
that the likelihood of employing an Other category worker is negatively
related to nonprofit ownership, hospital affiliation, resident acuity, the
percentage of residents on Medicare, market competition, and market
demand.
Among all the potential interaction effects tested, only the interaction
between market demand (percentage of the population age 75 or over)
and market competition is found to be statistically significant. The finding indicates that market demand moderates the negative relation between market competition and employment of Other category social
service providers; the higher the percentage of people age 75 or over
in the county where a nursing home is located, the more positive the
effect of market competition on the employment of the Other category
social service providers.

Discussion
The federal regulations that identify qualified social service providers
in nursing homes fall short of recognized professional standards for
social work services and quality psychosocial care in nursing homes
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(NASW 2003). This population-based study of U.S. nursing homes
employs OSCAR data to examine the structure of social service staffing
in those homes. It increases understanding of a neglected aspect of
the literature on staffing in nursing homes by providing a profile of
social service staffing across U.S. nursing homes of all sizes. It also
contributes to the limited knowledge base by examining the extent to
which staffing variation is due to facility service environment factors
within the nursing home organization and to contextual factors. Similar to studies of nurse staffing, the current results suggest that staffing
is influenced by several structural factors within the facility service
environment and by contextual factors. Results also suggest that, both
for the entire sample of homes in 2003 and for the subgroup of homes
with more than 120 beds, market forces are strong predictors of qualified social service staffing.
Staffing Skill Mix
Although most (88 percent) homes with more than 120 beds reportedly
met the federal minimum standard in 2003, employing at least one
qualified social service provider, more than twice as many (9,770) had
120 or fewer beds (and so were not required to meet that standard).
Only slightly more than half (53 percent) of these smaller facilities
report employing someone who met the federal standards for a qualified
social service provider. Across all nursing homes in 2003, regardless of
bed size, 36 percent of facilities reportedly did not offer residents the
services of a social service provider deemed qualified under the federal
standard. Nursing homes with 121 or more beds average 1.910 total
FTE qualified social service providers, whereas smaller facilities average
.815 full-time-equivalent qualified providers. Most of these hours were
contributed by full-time providers; use of part-time and contract staffing
is minimal.
Across facilities of any size, only 45 percent of nursing homes reportedly employ Other category social service providers (i.e., those who
do not meet the minimum federal standard). The hours worked by
these Other category social service providers are highest in facilities with
121 or more beds (.75 FTE). Similar to the findings for qualified social
service providers, use of part-time and contract providers in the Other
category represents a small proportion of the staffing across nursing
homes of any size.
Results suggest that nonprofit ownership, facility size, and resident
acuity increase the likelihood that facilities with more than 120 beds
employ a qualified social service provider. Nonprofit ownership and
resident acuity are negatively related to the likelihood of employing
Other category providers in all facilities. Other facility factors have differential effects on the two categories of providers. Membership in a
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chain is not statistically significantly associated with the likelihood of
employing qualified providers, but it is negatively related to the likelihood of employing Other social service providers.
Across facilities of all sizes, the percentage of residents funded by
Medicare is found to be inversely related to the likelihood of employing
Other category social service providers. The only payer mix variable
found to affect staffing, the percentage of facility residents funded by
Medicare, is estimated to reduce the likelihood that a nursing home
employs Other category providers. In homes with 121 or more beds,
neither Medicare nor Medicaid payer status is estimated to influence
the likelihood that a facility adheres to the federal minimum standard
by employing a qualified social service provider.
Resident Acuity
The findings indicate that, among facilities with 121 or more beds,
resident acuity is positively and statistically significantly associated with
the odds of employing a qualified social service provider. Among facilities of any size, resident acuity is negatively and statistically significantly
associated with the likelihood of employing Other category providers.
High resident acuity enables facilities to maximize reimbursement for
services based on physical rehabilitation needs.
At the core of social service activity in hospital-affiliated nursing homes
are comprehensive psychosocial assessment and care planning. These
efforts ensure timely processing of admissions and discharges. This study
finds that hospital affiliation is negatively and statistically significantly
associated with the likelihood that a nursing home employs Other category social service providers. However, hospital affiliation does not
influence the likelihood that a home with 121 or more beds adheres
to the minimum federal standard by employing a qualified social service
provider. This suggests that social service staffing may be driven primarily
by efforts to meet minimum federal standards instead of by efforts to
meet resident need. This is not surprising given the Prospective Payment
System reimbursement scheme, which bundles social services as a fixed
component of the broad category of ancillary services. The current
reimbursement system provides no incentive for nursing homes to deliver social service in response to specific resident needs.
The Prospective Payment System mandates that nursing care and specialized therapies be reimbursed on the basis of resident acuity and the
associated intensity of care delivered. Established in 1997 as part of the
Balanced Budget Act (111 Stat. 251), the Prospective Payment System
implements per diem reimbursement for nursing home care. The reimbursement is adjusted on the basis of case mix in a facility. Resident
acuity case mix is determined through a resident classification system
derived from resident assessment data and by weighted staff-time data
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(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2009). There is much to
be learned about resident acuity and its relationship to the kinds of
psychosocial care delivered by qualified social service providers. Providing residents with psychosocial care, including, for example, support
and advocacy for end-of-life decision making, may be just as time-intensive for social service staff and may require high staff qualifications.
Existing measures of resident acuity may not fully reflect the job tasks
and demands placed upon qualified social service providers. This, in
turn, may lead to the limited predictive power of the measures.

Market Forces
Results suggest that, among facilities in the subgroup required to adhere
to the minimum federal standards, market forces exert an important
influence on the structure of social service staffing. Among nursing
homes required to meet the federal standard, market competition in
the community where the nursing home was located is estimated to
diminish the chances that a facility adheres to the requirement to employ a qualified social service provider. This is the strongest predictor
variable. A statistically significant interaction between market competition and market demand (percentage of county residents age 75 or
older) influences the employment of Other category social service providers. Although market competition is found to be negatively related
to the odds of employing an Other category provider, there is an interaction effect with market demand. These findings may reflect that
resources in competitive labor markets are allocated to recruitment of
other nursing home staff or other operations.
The finding that market demand moderates the negative relation
between market competition and the likelihood of employing Other
category providers may be related to financial pressures on nursing
homes. Cutting qualified social service staffing and diluting the professional ranks with Other category providers may be responses to cost
reduction imperatives. One may presume that, when more nursing
home facilities are in a community and more of the population is age
75 or over, the demand for social service is higher and concern for
quality of care is greater. Information about quality is found on the
Nursing Home Compare site, a national nursing home database maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.2 However,
the database does not report measures of social service staffing or psychosocial care provision as quality indicators. As a result, consumers
have limited access to information about the quality of social service
provided in nursing homes.
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Limitations and Future Directions
One important limitation of this study is the reliance on the OSCAR
staffing data. The data are self-reported by facility administrators, and
they are subject to cross-state variation due to differing facility survey
methods and limitations of the OSCAR measures. Data are reported
once per year and provide only a snapshot of staffing activity at one
point in time. As such, the staffing numbers reported may not represent
the average number of social service providers employed throughout
the year. However, OSCAR still provides the best available national data
on nursing home facilities in the United States. Due to limited variation,
this study does not differentiate among full-time, part-time, and contract
social service providers. Future research should address this issue. The
use of agency contract staffing for other disciplines within the nursing
home is known to be problematic for the outcomes of residents and
facilities (Bourbonniere et al. 2006).
Because of the use of cross-sectional data, the current results may be
biased by unobserved heterogeneity. This study is also unable to provide
information about resident outcomes associated with social service staffing levels. Examining the nature of any such association is an essential
next step for social work research on staffing in nursing homes.
Little is known about qualified social service provision’s relations to
the scope and type of psychosocial care or about that care’s relations
to resident and facility outcomes. Such outcomes include bed occupancy
and other aspects of financial performance. Because market factors have
such a strong influence on staffing, it is crucial to establish connections
between the provision of social service by qualified providers and subsequent benefits for residents, families, and nursing home organizations.
If researchers can demonstrate that resident quality of life and facility
performance benefit from qualified social service provided to nursing
home residents, such a finding will lend credibility to the social work
profession’s efforts to advocate for stronger social service staffing regulations. This kind of study will require longitudinal data to evaluate
dynamic relationships among social service staffing, nursing home quality, and resident outcomes.
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Appendix
Table A1
Bivariate Correlation
1
Pearson correlations, hypothesis 1:*
1. Facility size
2. % of 75⫹ residents in county
3. % of residents on Medicare
4. % of residents on Medicaid
5. Market competition
6. Resident acuity
Pearson correlations, hypothesis 2:†
1. Facility size
2. % of 75⫹ residents in county
3. % of residents on Medicare
4. % of residents on Medicaid
5. Market competition
6. Resident acuity
Cramer’s V test, hypothesis 1:‡
1. Chain membership
2. Ownership
3. Hospital affiliated
Cramer’s V, hypothesis 2:§
1. Chain membership
2. Ownership
3. Hospital affiliated

2

3

4

5

6

1
⫺.01024
.03775
.00479 ⫺.10351
.03571
⫺.01024 1
.02874 ⫺.04982
.06926 ⫺.09514
.03775
.02874 1
⫺.57649 ⫺.07625
.03348
.00479 ⫺.04982 ⫺.57649 1
.1088
.07831
⫺.10351
.06926 ⫺.07625
.1088
1
.03589
.03571 ⫺.09514
.03348
.07831
.03589 1
1
⫺.10762
⫺.03253
.1296
⫺.1758
.07728

⫺.10762
1
⫺.06101
⫺.06908
.19129
⫺.1623

⫺.03253
.1296 ⫺.1758
.07728
⫺.06101 ⫺.06908
.19129 ⫺.1623
1
⫺.57429 ⫺.13016
.01952
⫺.57429 1
.11926
.08672
⫺.13016
.11926 1
⫺.04403
.01952
.08672 ⫺.04403 1

1

.3082
1

.0913
.2642
1

1

.2945
1

.1187
.3603
1

* Pearson correlations of continuous independent variables in nursing homes with 121 or more
beds (hypothesis 1; n p 4,424).
†
Pearson correlations of continuous independent variables in all nursing homes (hypothesis
2; N p 14,194).
‡
Cramer’s V test for categorical independent variables in nursing homes with 121 or more
beds (hypothesis 1; n p 4,424).
§
Cramer’s V test for categorical independent variables in all nursing homes (hypothesis 2;
N p 14,194).
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Notes
This research was sponsored by the Hartford Geriatric Social Work Faculty Scholars
Program supported by a grant to the Gerontological Society of America from the John
A. Hartford Foundation.
1. The resident acuity index represents the sum of (totally dependent for eating # 3)
⫹ (requiring assistance from one or two staff with eating # 2) ⫹ (either independent
or requiring supervision eating) ⫹ (totally dependent of toileting # 5) ⫹ (requiring
assistance of one or two staff with toileting # 3) ⫹ (independent or requiring supervision
with toileting) ⫹ (totally dependent for transferring # 5) ⫹ (requiring the assistance
from one or two staff with transferring # 3) ⫹ (independent or requiring supervision
for transferring) ⫹ (bedfast # 5) ⫹ (chair-bound # 3) ⫹ (ambulatory) ⫹ (receiving
respiratory care) ⫹ (receiving suctioning) ⫹ (receiving intravenous therapy) ⫹ (receiving
tracheostomy care) ⫹ (receiving parenteral feeding).
2. See http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/Include/DataSection/Questions/
ProximitySearch.asp.
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